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Labour parties are not all that common in democratic systems and as such labour parties, 
with their explicit ties to unions, have not been fully accounted for in the literature 
exploring the evolution of political parties.  In this paper I will draw on interviews conducted 
with union officials and party activists in Australia, Britain and Sweden to explore the extent 
to which the labour parties in these three countries have moved away from Duverger’s 
‘mass party model’ and instead adopted features more associated with electoralist parties.1  
I will begin by examining the environment in which these three parties operate before 
examining the strategies they have adopted to maintain their electability.  I seek to discover 
if there are commonalities in the way labour parties have evolved, as well as explore the 
role of unions in either forming a barrier, or providing additional pressure, for party change.  
This paper is not meant to provide definitive answers, but rather to spark a debate about 
whether labour parties should be seen as a distinct party family that face similar pressures 
and opportunities.   
 
 Background 
Labour parties are distinguished by their direct ties to unions and their commitment to 
labourism.  Proponents of labourism suggest that ‘the capitalist state could be managed to 
the advantage of the working class by a combination of a strong trade union movement 
with a Parliamentary Labor Party.’2  Long standing labour parties exist in Australia, the 
United Kingdom, New Zealand, Norway and Sweden amongst others, although, some of 
these parties have changed their affiliation rules.3  These parties emerged around the same 
time, and like other parties that formed in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, 
they developed into what became known as mass parties.4  Such parties have been forced 
to evolve in order to compete successfully in the modern electoral marketplace.   
 
In 2011, party activist and former Rudd speech writer, Troy Bramston, argued that the 
Australian Labor Party (ALP) was in danger of becoming a catch-all party and perhaps had 
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already moved in this direction.5  Amongst scholars of Australian party politics the debate 
has moved well beyond this point.  A consensus has emerged that the ALP is better 
described as an electoral-professional party or more controversially a cartel party.6  The 
debate in Australia is reflective of the more general debate regarding the fate of former 
mass parties.  
  
From the second half of the twentieth century political scientists began to theorise that 
mass parties were evolving.  Scholars have described these new parties in a variety of ways; 
some of the most notable models include the catch-all party, the electoral-professional 
party and more recently, the cartel party.7  These models portray parties as moving away 
from concrete ideological commitments and links with particular groups in society, and 
instead working to broaden their electoral appeal.  These theorists have also noted a 
transfer of authority away from the extra-parliamentary party to the parliamentary wing.  
These models are not without critics and scholars examining individual labour parties have 
also raised questions about their applicability.       
   
Scholars in Australia, Britain and Sweden have drawn on the party change literature, but the 
extent to which parties have move away from their foundations as mass parties is still a 
subject of debate.  Since Blair’s rise a plethora of books and articles on New Labour have 
been produced.8  Many of these highlight the degree to which the party has evolved away 
from its origins in terms of policy and party culture.  For instance, Dennis Kavanagh argues 
that ‘New Labour is a vote-seeking party, perfectly fulfilling Otto Kirchheimer’s criteria of a 
catch-all party, or Panebianco’s “electoral professional” party.’9  Meg Russell also 
acknowledges that the party has changed; however, she maintains that conference remains 
important and argues that the party leadership is cautious of alienating party members.10  
This indicates that the influence party activists and union officials has been downgraded, but 
further research needs to be undertaken to fully understand the role of direct and indirect 
members in the modern party.  In the case of the Swedish Social Democratic Workers’ Party 
(Sveriges socialdemokratiska arbetareparti SAP) the effects of social change have been 
acknowledged; however, scholars such as Nicholas Aylott argue that the party does not fully 
match the electoralal-professional model.11  Aylott points out that even though SAP has 
ended the practice of collective union membership; union links remain integral to the 
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party.12  While some questions have been raised about the applicability of the party change 
literature, it is an understudied area worthy of further attention and a comparative study 
will better highlight the evolutionary path of labour parties.   
 
Political Environment and Party Change  
A country’s party system, electoral laws and political culture has an enormous impact on the 
types of parties that emerge and the strategies they are able to employ.  It is important to 
consider the electoral environment to make sure the comparison is of parties and not 
nations.  Mair and Muddle write: ‘Given that much of what individual parties do is 
constrained by the logistics of the system of competition in which they are located, what 
appears as a cross-national party similarity may therefore turn out to be a cross-national 
systemic similarity.’13  This means it is important to consider the question of political 
environment when asking if labour parties are a distinct party family that face distinct 
pressures.   
 
Electoral Environments14 
 Australian Labor 
Party 
Swedish Social 
Democratic Workers’ 
Party 
British Labour Party 
National Population 22, 697, 645  9, 507, 324 61, 565, 000 
Party Membership 45, 000 106, 000 200, 000 
Union Density 18%  71%  28% 
Party Financing Public and private 
funding. 
Public and private 
funding. 
No substantial public 
funding 
Party System 2 major parties  Multiparty   2 major parties 
Electoral System Preferential Proportional First past the post 
 
The Australian Labor Party emerged in the early 1890s out of the union movement.  The 
party formed the first labour government in the world and it continues to be a key player in 
Australia’s two and half party system.  The party’s original organisational structures remain 
largely the same, however, there has been a shift in authority away from the extra-
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parliamentary party.  Labor Party parliamentarians continue to sign the pledge to uphold 
the party platform, but the actual power structures are not as clear as this implies.  One 
interviewee who has experience with Labor’s policy forums stated that ‘whilst we might put 
some more specific initiatives in the platform, generally the parliamentary wing is slow to 
adopt initiatives of the party.’15  The ability of the extra-parliamentary to exert concerted 
authority has declined with its numbers. 
 
Membership has declined from the party’s heyday when it could claim 400, 000 members.16  
Membership is now approximately 45,000 and membership through affiliated unions has 
also declined to fewer than 1.1 million members.17  The party’s membership figures have 
declined concurrently with the union movement.  In the year 2000 unions could only claim 
1.9 million members which represented 24.7 per cent of the workforce and the numbers 
have continued to drop since then.18  Even so, the union affiliates retain an important place 
in party decision making structures.  As would be expected, the larger the union the greater 
their ability to influence within the Labor Party, but a union’s influence largely depends on 
the specific issue.19  Moreover, the party continues to rely on the unions for funding.  While 
Labor receives donations from prominent individuals and state funding, the bulk of its 
funding comes from unions.20  In addition to providing membership dues, party members 
and union affiliates provide significant labour to support the party’s activities.21  In a recent 
party review strategies to increase the membership and attract party supporters were put 
forward.  The review process is ongoing and it is not yet known how the review process will 
play out at the state branch level.    
 
The British Labour Party formally emerged in 1900 and developed similar structures to its 
Australian counterpart.  In 1997 its internal organisation underwent a shakeup with the 
implementation of the Partnership in Power policy.  This policy was designed to make the 
conference less volatile and to move policy debates behind closed doors to the new 
National Policy Forum.  Blair stated that the goal of the National Policy Forum was to allow 
more people to contribute to policy making.22  Despite such comments New Labour 
became known for its centralisation and the dominance of the party in parliament.  One 
interviewee stated that ‘fewer people were participating, [in partnership in power 
structures] people were saying well what’s the point, the government, the party leadership 
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ignores it’.23  He also noted that ‘at the national policy forum meetings themselves there 
was huge effort made to persuade people to back off on certain issues.’24  The effort made 
to control debate was clearly evident at the 2005 conference.  Ann Black recalls that the 
‘speeches in the hall were uniformly bland’ and discord only arose when an 82 year old 
man was ejected for heckling a minister.25  Blair government backbencher, Richard Burden, 
sums it up: ‘Mechanisms for the party to communicate directly with its members may be 
more extensive than they have ever been.  But such communication is essentially “top 
down”.  Power is increasingly centralised around the leader’s office, with immense 
pressure on everyone else to fall in line.’26  These comments suggest that the party should 
be categorised as an electoralist party, however, a more nuanced analysis is required in 
order to discover any points of successful resistance on the part of the extra-parliamentary 
party.  It is necessary to ask if these changes are permanent or simply represent Labour at 
a particular point in time.   
 
What cannot be denied is that since the election of the Blair government in 1997 the British 
Labour Party has suffered a significant membership decline from the 1997 height of 400, 
000 members.27  Likewise, the composition of the membership has changed over time.  
Referencing the work of Seyd and Whiteley, Steve Ludlam writes: ‘In 1990, two-thirds of 
Labour’s members were union members; by 1999 two-thirds were not.  And among party 
members who had joined after 1994, the non-union proportion was even higher’.28  The 
strength of the union movement has also declined.  In 1976 trade unionism in Britain was 
sitting at 50 per cent but by 2010 it had dropped to approximately 30 per cent of the 
workforce.29  Internal polling suggests that trade union members are not much more likely 
to vote Labour than the rest of the public.’30  Even so, union affiliates remain an important 
part of the party.  Despite the fact that the Blair government sought to foster closer links 
with business and wealthy individuals, (between 1980 and 1993 the proportion of Labour 
funding derived from the unions fell from 80 per cent to 54 per cent31), union funding 
remains important.  One interviewee stated: ‘trade union funding is crucial.  It makes up a 
very large percentage of the Labour Party’s income and without it the party would be lost.’32     
 
The Swedish Social Democrats officially emerged in 1889 and over its lifespan the party has 
achieved enormous electoral success.  As the above table suggests, support for unions and 
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SAP remains strong in Sweden.  Social democracy remains a significant part of the Swedish 
political culture and Sweden has one of the most highly unionised workforces in the world.33  
Unions are viewed as more legitimate in Sweden than in the UK34 and arguably this also 
holds true for Australia.  Even so, Sweden has been subject to many of the same pressures 
that other parties have been struggling with.  The size of the working class has declined in 
Sweden as it has in Scandinavia more generally.35  Since the 1970s the relationship between 
SAP and the Swedish Trade Union Confederation (Landsorganisation LO) has been subject to 
tensions, particularly as the party attempted to expand its electoral appeal beyond its 
working class base.36  Swedish unions affiliate to one of three confederations: the LO, the 
Swedish Confederation of Professional Employees (TCO) and the Swedish Confederation of 
Professional Associations (SACO).  While the LO remains the largest group it has declined in 
comparison to the other two groups.37  At times there has been talk of distancing SAP from 
the LO and some discussion of seeking closer links with the TCO and SACO.38 As seen 
elsewhere, the proportion of funding the SAP receives from the unions has declined, and 
since the 1960s the party receives funding from the state.39   However, ties between the LO 
and SAP have not been disbanded.   
 
These brief overviews reveal that all three parties have undergone significant decline in 
membership and alterations in their relationships with their traditional working class bases.  
These changes are in keeping with general trajectory suggested by the electoralist party 
literature, however, it is necessary to delve deeper into relationship between these parties 
and their union affiliates the extent to which the relationship has changed. 
 
Party Organisation and Union Ties 
Evidence from all three countries suggests that there is hostility towards unions amongst 
the general public and all three parties have discussed severing or at least reducing their 
unions links.40  Even in Sweden where social democracy is much more popular people have 
exhibited suspicion of the union link.41  The Australian and British Labour parties have 
moved to decrease union voting power within the party.  In 1993 British Labour reduced the 
voting strength of unions at conference and also repealed the mandatory requirement for 
party members to join a union.42  In 1995 British Labour ended the practice of union’s 
directly sponsoring individual MPs.  Unions are able to sponsor constituency parties and 
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interviews reveal that strong links still exist between unions and individual 
parliamentarians.43  This distancing has occurred on both sides.  During the Blair years 
several unions decided to withhold or reduce funding to the party.44  The Fire Brigades 
Union disaffiliated in 2004 and the National Union of Rail, Maritime and Transport Workers 
was expelled for support non-Labour candidates.45  Moreover, just as in Britain, a small 
number of Australian unions have rethought political funding.46  Data from the 2010-11 
financial year reveals that the Australian Metal Workers’ Union and the Construction, 
Forestry and Mining Employees’ Union donated funds to the Australian Greens.47 It is the 
Swedish Social Democrats, however, that have made the most dramatic changes to the rules 
governing the relationship between the party and the unions. 
 
The Swedish Confederation of Trade Unions emerged in 1898 and continues to organise 
‘blue-collar workers’.48  SAP maintains close links with the LO.  The Social Democrats have 
the power to select two of the five appointees to the Trade Union Confederation’s executive 
body and the president of the LO is generally a member of SAP’s steering committee.49  
Despite the close relationship between SAP and the union movement, the party made a 
decision to alter the relationship.  In 1987 SAP ended the practice of collective union 
affiliation.  Instead local union branches can affiliate to the party at the local level and 
individual unionists can affiliate as individual party members.50  The level of influence that 
unions command within SAP depends on the number of that union’s members who have 
‘opted into the party.’51  At the local level unions can still have an impact on the party, for 
instance on they can influence selection of candidates.52  Nevertheless, the changes to 
affiliation raised questions about the union movement’s ability to continue to exert 
influence inside the party.53   
 
Despite the rhetoric and the rule changes all three parliamentary parties continue to engage 
with their extra-parliamentary parties and in particular their union affiliates.  Mechanisms 
continue to exist for union affiliates to exert influence and put forward their views and 
interview evidence from all three countries makes clear that parliamentarians maintain links 
with particular unions.  While these links exist it is important to examine labour in 
government to assess the level of influence of the party organisation on policy. 
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Labour in Government  
Labour in government is able to access the resources of the state and therefore has less 
need to rely on the resources of the party.  Furthermore, there are greater costs associated 
with a strong extra-parliamentary party which has the potential to push the parliamentary 
party in directions that may prove to be electorally costly.  With this in mind it is worthwhile 
to briefly examine labour in government.   
 
The three parties have different leadership selection strategies and in all three union 
affiliates play a role in selecting the leader.  British unions have a direct role in the Electoral 
College but must poll their members.  In SAP there is a taboo against openly campaigning 
for the leadership.  A committee of party ‘elders’ gauges the views of different groups with 
the party and then puts forward a name to be confirmed at the party congress.54  In the ALP 
the parliamentary leader is selected by the Parliamentary Labor Party.  Paul Reynolds, 
commenting on the Queensland branch of the party, states that over time as the factional 
system became entrenched electorates have come to be the domains of individual factions 
and it atypical for a seat to move between factions.55  Factions have both union and 
individual members and through factional associations unions play a role in the selection of 
leaders. 
 
The Rudd (2007-2010), Blair (1997-2007) and Persson (1996-2010) governments all 
developed strained relationships with their broader parties and union affiliates.  All three 
leaders sought to publicly distance themselves from the union movement.  Göran Persson 
once described the LO as ‘an interest group like any other’.56  In 2007 Kevin Rudd stated: 
‘Trade unions will survive or die based on their ability to compete – that means being able 
to offer working Australians services to represent them which they can’t obtain 
elsewhere’.57  Blair stated that the British Labour Party is 'not the political arm of anyone 
today other than the British people ... Forget the past'.58  These comments give some idea of 
the attitude of these three leaders to working with their union affiliates and illustrate the 
existence of a belief that Labour governments need to show distance from unions. 
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The Blair government and New Labour has been subject considerable academic analysis and 
its approach to working with union is well known.  As Chris Howell points out: ‘hostility to 
the trade unions is an integral part of the modernization strategy.’59  The government’s 
attitude was evident in the fact that they did not fully restore union rights removed during 
the Thatcher years.  While there were opportunities for union representatives to meet with 
ministers and MPs, established mechanisms for dialogue, such as the Trade Union Liaison 
Committee, did not operate under the Blair government.60  While the government was 
popular they could afford to maintain this attitude.   By 2004 the government was preparing 
for its third election campaign and could no longer afford to ignore its base. The 2004 
Warwick Agreement was a meeting between affiliated unions and government 
representatives.  The unions did not obtain all of their demands, but they were successful in 
gaining some concessions from the government.61    According to Ian J. Griffiths this meeting 
‘averted the threat of mass disaffiliation from the party by the unions and helped to secure 
union support for Labour in the 2005 election.’62  This led the Conservatives to claim that 
the affiliated unions were the party’s ‘de facto rulers’63 a similar claim was also levelled 
against the Rudd government.   
 
During the 2007 federal election, claims that 70 per cent of a future Labor government 
would be former union officers were used in an attempt to frighten voters.64  Despite such 
claims, Labor under the leadership of Kevin Rudd was successful bringing an end to the long 
lived Howard government (1996-2007).  Labor’s electoral success must at least be partially 
attributed to the union movement’s ‘Your Rights at Work’ campaign and the incoming Rudd 
government was committed to dismantling the Howard government’s industrial relations 
policy.  The resulting Fair Work Act was produced with the assistance of the Committee on 
Industrial Relations (COIL) which incorporated both business and union representatives.65  
The resulting legislation did not incorporate all union demands, in particular the retention 
Australian Building and Construction Commission was a sore point with some union 
affiliates.  Looking more broadly it would be implausible to describe Labor governments in 
Australia as the servants of their extra-parliamentary organisations, but it is clear that 
unions have greater access to government when Labor holds power.   
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Economic crises often give rise to tensions between labour governments and the broader 
party.  This was certainly true of the most recent Swedish Social Democratic government 
which had to contend with a country in economic difficulty.  The government dealt with the 
poor economic situation by reducing benefits for the sick and unemployed.66  The 
government’s choice of strategies did not endear them to the broader party.  One union 
leader notes ‘during the LO Congress in 1996, it was the first time and so far the only time, 
that LO has marched out from the Congress Centre to demonstrate against an Social 
Democratic government.’67  Despite such tensions consultation continue to occur.  
Anderson and Meyer examine the pension reforms of the mid-1990s and argue that even 
though all three union confederations were consulted the greater influence due to its links 
with SAP.68  However, since the party lost power in 2006 it has undergone significant 
changes.  One interviewee noted that within SAP there has been ‘a very strong movement 
to the centre... they try to attract more the white collar workers and the upper middle 
class’.69  It will be interesting to see how the next Social Democratic government will 
interact with the party organisation. 
 
 
Is there something unique about labour parties? 
The study of party families generally and labour parties as a distinct family are both under-
theorised areas of research.70  Apart from Rawson’s article on the life-span of labour parties 
written in 1969, there are very few studies that focus specially on labour parties at the 
macro level.71  Few political scientists even draw a distinction between labour parties and 
other social-democratic parties or conduct studies that directly compare a range of labour 
parties.72  There have been articles comparing the ALP with its counterparts in Britain and 
New Zealand, studies of European parties and others exploring the social democratic parties 
of Scandinavia, as well as separate works examining unions.73  While these, and studies of 
individual studies are useful, what is lacking is an overarching study examining the evolution 
of labour parties and their power structures.  In this paper I have attempted to begin this 
task.  Future comparative research needs to be undertaken in this area.  Karl Loxbo 
concludes his 2011 study of the Swedish Social Democrats with the statement: ‘An open 
question in the future analysis of the historic fate of intra-party democracy is, therefore, 
whether the few party members that do remain in parties exercise less influence over party 
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policy than members in the past or, rather, if they have become a force with which to be 
reckoned.’74  I would add that another key question is whether the presence of unions gives 
strength to the extra-parliamentary wing.  In this vein, it would be worthwhile to explore a 
former labour party, such as the Dutch Labour Party in order to compare the ability of the 
party organisation to direct the parliamentary party without the added force from union 
affiliates.   
 
While the decline in individual membership numbers and union strength cannot be denied 
it is clear that parliamentary parties and their leaders cannot afford to neglect their extra-
parliamentary wing if they wish to achieve long term success.  Unions continue to exert 
considerable influence in all three parties.  Union support played a crucial role in the rise of 
both Julia Gillard and Ed Miliband and the Swedish Social Democrats have a new leader 
with a trade union background.  Blue Labour, which emphasises connections with the 
working class, is one of the most dynamic strands of thought in British Labour today and 
recent internal reviews in Australia and Britain have proposed measures to engage the 
membership and open up decision making structures.75  As one British union official 
interviewee states: ‘The trade union movement formed the Labour Party for a start.  I 
mean, they are in my opinion nothing less than a political wing of the trade union 
movement.’76  This comment makes clear that the ethos that gave rise to labour parties 
continues to exist in some form, what this means in a practical sense is deserving of further 
attention.   
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